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exchanges, and perhaps get out of this ideowhrojical foreign policy so that we can move to sort of the latin left 3.0, the 1.0 was probably fidel in cuba which i think pretty much went out of, you know, it's been superseded. the second wave is probably hugo chavez. but i think the latin left needs to progress towards a third phase. so perhaps if you combine all of these measures the more innovative social measures and perhaps adherence to more environmental climate change concerns, then the bolivarrian revolution can continue and influence the wider region. >> charlie: many people think that there's little resemblance between chavez and bolivar. >> well, yeah, i think that chavez always made these historical illusions to simon bolivar. i think it was a little bit over the top sometimes. but simon bolivar resonates in venezuela. he united the country. throughout much of the 19th century venezuela was divided politically. you had these regional leaders and the 20th century was dominated by military dictators. venezuela harks back to them and that resonates quite a lot symbolically. that's why
, but it does seem to me that a good part of north korean foreign policy is based on bluster. and so if that is your strategy, you know, maybe -- it's less important that the rockets really work, or maybe they don't work at all. that's less important than if you can make people -- and perhaps your own population -- think that they work. >> could i -- i think steve has made some very, very apt points. this is rocket science, and it's not easy. if there is any good news in this story, and i use that term advisedly, it's the fact that north korea's industrial capacities to test on a regular basis and so forth are probably very constrained. because you don't see -- i'm not trying to say it has to be totally equivalent to the kinds of program that is we ran or the russians ran, but this is not what i would regard as a true testing program, and it's just not frequent enough, it's not intense enough to quantify. that said, the challenge here is maybe less what the north koreans may believe they have. it may be more what we believe they have and how we respond accordingly. and i must say the
to him of his reign. his father died in 1944. two years before that, his dad told foreign reporters that his son, kim jung il had been in charge of day-to-day policies for the previous decade. that takes us back to the early 1980's. if you want to get into real inside baseball, north koreaian media was talking about the rise of the party center in the 1970's. party center being eventually debuted as kim jung il. he had about a quarter century of grooming before becoming the king. he had a long time to consolidate authority. with with his hands on the dashbored, he-dived the plane. he was the only -- he more or less destroyed the institutions of party and state. so by the late 1990's and early 2000's there was no correspondence between what the party was supposed to look like and what the cabinet and state system was supposed to look like and the way he was operating the government. he was more or less running the country out of his bathtub with a couple of police secret forces to help. he paid no attention whatsoever to continuing the dynasty. he was completely feckless on this. t
Search Results 0 to 10 of about 11 (some duplicates have been removed)